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Three conceptions of a theory of institutions 
N. Emrah Aydinonat1 & Petri Ylikoski2 
Abstract: We compare Guala’s unified theory of institutions with that of Searle and Greif. We 
show that unification can be many things and may be associated with diverse explanatory goals.  
We also highlight some of the important shortcomings of Guala’s account: it does not capture all 
social institutions, its ability to bridge social ontology and game theory is based on a problematic 
interpretation of the type-token distinction, and its ability to make social ontology useful for 
social sciences is hindered by Guala’s interpretation of social institution types as social kinds 
akin to natural kinds.  
Keywords: Institutions, unification, social ontology, economics  
Introduction  
Francesco Guala develops a unified theory of institutions in his book Understanding 
Institutions. He presents his proposed theory, which unites the rules and equilibrium 
approaches to institutions, as an alternative to John Searle’s account. He synthesizes the 
insights from various fields to establish the continuity between social ontology and social 
sciences, and to gain a better understanding of institutions. In the present paper, we compare 
Guala’s project with Searle’s theory and Avner Greif’s attempt to create a unified framework for 
studying institutions. We chose the first for the obvious reason that Guala’s and Searle’s projects 
are rivals within social ontology. Greif’s framework, on the other hand, was chosen for two 
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reasons. First, it is noticeably similar to Guala’s project, not only in that it combines the rules 
and equilibrium approaches, but it also brings together insights from various fields. Second, the 
subtle differences between the two help us to consider the extent to which Guala’s theory could 
be useful from a social scientific perspective.  
A comparison of these three views of institutions not only illuminates Guala’s project, but also 
serves to illustrate that a unified theory of institutions can be many things. Our primary interest 
is in how these three theorists conceptualize unification, the appropriate level of abstraction, 
and the explanatory goals of the theory. In other words, we will compare their projects 
advocating a unified theory of institutions so as to learn some general lessons, not to assess how 
successful they are in accomplishing their goals. The latter task would require a much longer 
paper. Throughout the paper we illustrate the differences and similarities between these three 
accounts of institutions with respect to unification, level of abstraction and explanatory goals. 
Based on this comparative analysis we also point out some of the shortcomings in Guala’s 
account of social institutions. First, we argue that the proof-of-the-concept nature of Guala's 
theorizing prevents him from producing an all-encompassing account of social institutions. 
Complex social institutions such as 'institutions', 'university', 'government' does not fit 
comfortably to Guala's rules-in-equilibrium approach. Second, we point out that Guala's type-
token distinction plays a central role in his attempt to unify social ontology and to bridge game 
theory and social ontology. We show that this distinction is problematic and for this reason it 
remains unclear whether Guala's account can capture the "essence" of any particular 
institution—in Guala’s terms, of token institutions. Third, Guala defines institutions, such as 
marriage, on the bases of the coordination and cooperation problems they solve, and the social 
activities they regulate. However, he is also aware of the fact that any two particular examples of 
an institution might not solve the same set of problems or regulate the same set of social 
activities. To overcome this difficulty, Guala presumes that social institution types can be 
conceived of as social kinds that are analogical to natural kinds. He further assumes that the 
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general concepts that social scientists use—such as 'marriage'—overlaps with these natural 
kinds. We argue a that this is a dubious solution to the problem of general concepts in the social 
sciences. Fourth, we highlight that Guala's account promises to produce a general 
understanding of stability and persistence of institutions, but not their emergence. We argue 
that Guala’s functionalist approach to institutions lacks the components that would be helpful 
for social scientists in reaching a better understanding of particular (token) institutions. Finally, 
we argue that the study of institutions should focus on particular institutions as historical causal 
complexes, not on their postulated abstract functional essences and suggest that social 
mechanisms should constitute the generalizable core of the social sciences.   
The paper is organized as follows. The first section highlights some central features of Guala’s 
theory. The second section compares it to Searle theory. The third section introduces Greif’s 
unified framework and contrasts it with Guala’s unification attempt. The fourth section reflects 
on what can be learned from the comparison and considers the implications for Guala’s project. 
The final section concludes the paper. 
Guala’s unification project 
Guala (2016) frames his approach in Understanding Institutions in terms of unification, 
beginning with the title of the first part of the book. Unification, in its different senses, is indeed 
an important characteristic of his approach. It is thus necessary to understand the senses in 
which his theory unifies. He appears throughout the book to be discussing three related 
conceptions of unification. First, he argues that “social ontology has been disunified for too long, 
and it is time that we put it together again” (2016, xxx), and he sets his main aim as “to unify the 
main traditions in the field of social ontology” (2016, xix). This is the book’s first promise: the 
unification of social ontology. Second, Guala attempts to unify the accounts of institutions in the 
social sciences and social ontology: let us call his attempt to unify these two fields field 
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unification. This is the second promise of the book. Guala’s intellectual strategy for delivering 
these promises is to bring together theoretical ideas that have been developed separately, and to 
synthesize them to build a general theory. Let us call this the composite unification strategy. We 
will now take a closer look at these ideas about unification. 
The context for Guala's project of field unification was conveniently set by John Searle. As Guala 
informs the reader, John Searle “has stated boldly that he cannot find anything helpful in the 
entire social science literature”. He goes on: “the dissatisfaction is reciprocal: social scientists 
have struggled to appreciate what the contribution of philosophy might be” (2016, xviii). Guala 
finds this situation unsatisfactory. He argues that although different scholars might “have 
different concerns”, their questions are generally the same: “What is an institution? What is the 
social world made of? How many kinds of social entities are there?” (2016, xxx). Thus, he 
continues to argue, one must find out whether the different answers provided by philosophers 
and social scientists are compatible, and if so, to what extent. This sets the task for the book. The 
aim is to demonstrate the possibility of field unification by presenting a theory that unifies “the 
main traditions in the field of social ontology” (2016, xix). Hence, the unification of social 
ontology is the path to field unification. It is for this reason that we need to consider how Guala 
delivers this promise. 
At this point the strategy of composite unification becomes relevant. Guala’s argument could be 
interpreted as a series of composite unifications. First, he suggests that we can unify two broad 
rational-choice approaches to institutions (namely, rules and equilibrium approaches) in the 
more powerful rules-in-equilibrium approach (2016, xxiii). He argues that this approach unifies 
the two approaches found in economics, suggesting that institutions “are better conceived as 
rules that people have an incentive to follow" (2016, 10). Second, he suggests that a number of 
ideas developed in social ontology —Frank Hindriks’ reductive theory of constitutive rules 
(Hindriks and Guala 2014; Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks 2005, 2009), David Lewis’ 
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(1969) account of conventions, and the incentivized action theory (Smit, Buekens, and du Plessis 
2014, 2011) — could be combined with the rules-in-equilibrium approach. Hindriks’ argument 
allows him to reduce Searle’s constitutive rules to ordinary regulative rules. This makes it 
possible to connect social ontology to Lewis’ account of conventions, and to game-theoretical 
accounts of institutions that it inspired—without the need for constitutive rules. Incentivized 
action theory makes it possible to link reasons for action with game-theoretical ideas, and Lewis 
does the same with conventions. These moves allow Guala to discuss institutions using the 
toolset of game theory, and to conceptualize them in terms of the rules and equilibria of games. 
His principle innovation does not concern these ingredients, but it is in how he puts them 
together. His main argument is that the resulting composite theory—or at least the outline of it—
demonstrates the possibility of field unification, is stronger than its individual components 
separately, and, finally, has more explanatory power than earlier field-specific theories. This 
argumentative strategy explains the prominence of Searle in Guala’s discussion: if he can 
successfully bring together ontological ideas that have been developed as alternatives to Searle’s 
views (i.e. unifying the opposition) and combine them with social-scientific concepts, not only 
will he have produced a comprehensive alternative to Searle’s social ontology, he will also have 
demonstrated that Searle’s posit of the separation between the fields is wrong.  
Guala’s unification project clearly has an explanatory motivation. He explicitly expresses this 
motivation in a paper written jointly with Frank Hindriks, in which they claim that the “payoff of 
unification is a significant increase in explanatory power” (Hindriks and Guala 2014, p. 469). 
Guala argues against rules-based accounts, for example, observing that they do not explain why 
people follow the rules. Combining the rules-based account with the equilibrium account, makes 
it possible to explain why people are motivated to follow the rules that constitute the institution. 
Furthermore, he argues, it explains why the institution may become persistent. In this way, the 
unified theory provides a better explanation of the raison d'être and persistence of institutions.  
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Nevertheless, there are limits to what a general theory can do. Guala recognizes that the rules-
in-the-equilibrium account is not sufficient to explain the emergence of an institution because it 
presupposes the existence of a correlating device. In the presence of multiple-equilibria, 
explaining emergence requires the studying of particular institutions and their history.  
"[…] equilibrium models provide legitimate explanations of the persistence of 
behavioral patterns. This does not mean of course that equilibrium models are 
well suited to provide other types of explanation, or that persistence is the only 
kind of phenomenon worthy of investigation in the social sciences. On the 
contrary, there are many other interesting aspects of social reality that call for 
different styles of explanation. But simple game-theoretic models can 
illuminate many features of institutions that otherwise would appear rather 
incomprehensible." (Guala 2016, 31) 
Guala presents an appealing way of building a theory of social institutions. Before we compare it 
with alternative visions of a unified theory of institutions, we will make some observations about 
the theory his composite strategy has produced. This theory unifies social ontology by bringing 
together existing ideas from social ontology and the social sciences. Guala’s grand claim is that 
the theory accomplishes field unification: it unifies social ontology and social scientific 
theorizing about institutions. However, what he has done is to connect social ontology with 
game theory-based theorizing about institutions. It remains to be demonstrated whether Guala’s 
theory can be used to reconstruct social-scientific theories and ideas that do not use game 
theory. Thus, complete field unification remains a promissory note in the book. It is still to be 
shown that the bridgehead of economic modelling can be extended to the deep inlands of social-
scientific theorizing. 
There is another promissory note that concerns the general applicability of the theory. Guala 
merely discusses some highly-stylized paradigmatic examples of institutions, such as money, 
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property rights, and marriage. It remains to be seen whether or not the theory can be applied to 
detailed examples of these institutions, or to institutions that are somewhat different from these 
core cases. For example, many institutions, such as ‘government’ and ‘university’, are highly 
complex and the ability of Guala’s account appears to be severely hindered by the rules-in-
equilibrium approach. At the very least, it remains an open question whether such complex 
institutions can be fully reconstructed within the rules-in-equilibrium framework. We are not 
arguing that this programmatic nature of the theory is a problem in itself – all the alternative 
theories face the same challenge – but it is important to recognize the proof-of-the-concept 
nature of Guala’s theorizing.  
The lever that allows Guala to bridge social ontology and game theory is the idea about levels of 
abstraction. For him there are three levels of abstraction in the analysis of institutions. The first 
is the level of particular institutions. These token institutions, as he calls them, have a history 
and a geographical location (Guala 2016, xx). The social sciences consider institutions at more 
general level, being concerned with types of institution: “monarchy”, “political party”, “family”, 
and “golf club” are some of his examples. Theories and models about types of institutions can 
differ in terms of generality: theories about Churches are more general than theories about 
Protestant Churches, for example. On the most general level the social sciences meet social 
ontology. According to Guala 
“Social ontologists investigate the social world at the highest level of 
abstraction, and devise theories that are supposed to hold for all social 
institutions irrespective of their individual features.” (Guala 2016, xxi) 
This is the trick: by conceptualizing the social sciences and philosophy in terms of levels of 
abstraction, Guala finds a meeting point between the two disciplines. Taking the common 
denominator of all institutions to be their function (institutions “facilitate coordination and 
cooperation”; 2016, xxiii), he conceptualizes all institutions as having a common essence:  
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“What all the institutions share is that they are solutions to the same 
problems, or equilibria of the same class of games.” (Guala 2016, 196) 
The hierarchy of levels of abstraction plays a vital role in Guala’s account. All particular 
institutions are tokens of social-scientific institution types. Social ontology in turn, deals with 
the highest level of abstraction: it is concerned with what is common to “all these types and 
tokens” (Guala 2016, xxii). This is not as simple as it sounds: consider what he says about 
marriage.  
“So by studying marriage practices in Florence during the thirteenth century, 
say, we can only learn about the particular way in which Florentine people 
organized child-rearing, reproduction, and economic cooperation at a 
particular time. To find out what marriage is in general—what marriage is as a 
type—we need to focus on the coordination problem as a whole, rather than on 
its specific solutions, because institution types are defined functionally, by 
reference to their goal or to the problems they solve. Since the same goal can 
be attained in many ways, the study of specific institutions tells us more about 
the specific solutions than about what they have in common. What all the 
institutions share is that they are solutions to the same problems, or equilibria 
of the same class of games.” (Guala 2016, 196) 
We find the loose way in which Guala employs the type-token distinction problematic. All 
Florentine marriages during the thirteenth century are tokens of the type ‘thirteenth century 
Florentine marriage’. However, it is not as obvious that the Florentine institution of marriage is 
a token of the more general type ‘marriage’. The latter is an observer’s category (or a theoretical 
concept) that lumps together similar enough institutions from different societies (and time 
periods). There is no guarantee that it captures the functional essence of all marriages, or even 
that there is such an essence. What we are saying is that both Florentine marriages and the 
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institution of the Florentine marriage are instances of the concept marriage, but they are not 
tokens of the type ‘marriage’. The reason this sophistry matters is that the former relation is 
much less demanding than the latter. All particular Florentine marriages presuppose the 
institution of Florentine marriage. They would not be Florentine marriages without there being 
the type, in other words the Florentine practices of arranging reproduction, inheritance and so 
on. However, the existence of the institution that we call Florentine marriage does not 
presuppose the existence of the more general type. Furthermore, the concept of marriage is a 
family-resemblance term, which implies that marriages need not have a shared essence. As an 
anthropological concept marriage is a flexible interpretive notion that does not allow general 
definition (Sperber 1996). Furthermore, the same point applies to many other general 
institutional concepts, including money and property. This has serious implications because 
Guala’s account of theorizing rests on a strong assumption about the relation between social-
scientific concepts and particular social institutions. If the type-token relation does not hold, 
there is much less reason to expect that abstract game-theoretical models can capture the 
functional essence of any particular institution. Furthermore, it implies that theories of social 
ontology cannot be tested “against types of institutions” (Guala 2016, xxi), and that they must be 
tested against facts about particular institutions. We will return to the implications of this 
observation in the final section.  
In sum, Guala presents us with an alternative ontological reconstruction of institutions that also 
explains their stability and persistence, but not their emergence. The explanation of emergence, 
and of change more generally, requires a different explanatory approach. The acknowledgement 
of this limitation brings up the central question of this paper: are ontological reconstruction and 




Guala and Searle 
Guala’s main adversary with regard to his book is John Searle. Quite clearly, Guala is attempting 
to provide an alternative to Searle’s vision of social ontology. This is reflected in substantial 
disagreements on issues such as the necessity of constitutive rules, the nature of deontic powers, 
and the need for collective intentionality. However, there are also deeper differences that reflect 
the fact that the two authors are engaged in quite different philosophical projects. Guala does 
not merely present an alternative ontological reconstruction of social institutions, he also 
provides an alternative vision of the relation between social sciences and philosophy, and even 
more importantly, a different account of the tasks of philosophical theory. 
Searle’s project of social ontology is purely philosophical. The main motive is to fit social reality 
to a more general ontology (Searle 1995, 5). The aim is not to integrate his account of social 
institutions into what social scientists are saying, but to make it compatible with other areas of 
ontology. In other words, he is concerned with how social things "hang together" with all the 
non-social stuff in the world. Consequently, his main task is to address these features of the 
social world that seem anomalous from the perspective of non-social ontology. The unification 
he seeks, is achieved in a general philosophical theory. Accordingly, his strategy is to provide a 
general theory about the ontology of institutional reality, and to show that this theory can be 
accommodated with a more general philosophical theory.   
This general philosophical goal has some important consequences. First, Searle’s account of 
institutions is not primarily explanatory: it rather concerns the ontological reconstruction of the 
institutional reality. One of his most central philosophical claims is the following:  
“With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality [...] 
is created by speech acts that have the same logical form as Declarations.” 
(Searle 2010, 12–13)  
11 
 
His concern with “the logical form” of social reality explains why Searle seems so unconcerned 
with questions such as how people manage to come to share the same collective attitudes, how 
institutional change occurs, or how institutions persist. Social-scientific concerns with 
explaining institutional emergence, change, and stability are not salient for Searle: ontological 
issues have to be settled first, and only then can social scientists start their work. In Searle’s 
view, the relationship between philosophical and social-scientific theories is asymmetric: 
foundational philosophical theory sets a constraint on acceptable social-scientific theories, but 
social-scientific theories do not have a similar role in philosophy. This is quite different from 
Guala’s position, which is that philosophy and the social sciences are continuous and thus 
positioned more symmetrically.  In Guala’s view, for example, philosophical theory of 
institutions should be able to account for their stability and persistence while leaving their 
emergence and change to social scientists. Searle ignores all three explanatory concerns.3 
It should be noted that Searle’s disdain of the social sciences does not follow directly from his 
philosophical goals. He could have chosen to pursue social ontology using social-scientific 
materials and examples. Although the social sciences are mostly continuous with everyday 
thinking, there are elements that expand it. They have much to say about macro scale social 
reality, for example, whereas Searle dismisses macro social facts as mere "systematic fallouts” 
(Searle 2010, 22). There is no deep philosophical justification for this kind of arrogance and lack 
of intellectual curiosity. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of Searle’s philosophical project 
in more social-science-friendly terms. We should not dismiss it merely because it does not seem 
to connect with the social sciences. For this reason, Guala is fully justified in addressing Searle’s 
main philosophical claims head on.  
                                                        




It is nevertheless possible to provide arguments that directly challenge the viability of Searle’s 
philosophical project. Consider, for example, the role of language in Searle’s and Guala’s 
theories. For Searle, language is the most fundamental institution. We think he is right in this. 
Language has a crucial role in the creation of institutional facts. Furthermore, linguistic 
conventions, grammatical rules, meanings, and speech acts are prime examples of social 
institutions. However, Searle fails to make his theory general in that he does not provide a full 
account of language as an institution, for the most part seemingly taking it as a given. Even more 
surprisingly, his theory is somewhat circular: as the above quotation shows, declarative speech 
acts are the basic building blocks of his theory. More precisely, he claims that institutional 
reality and declaratives have the same logical structure. However, this seems more like an 
intermediate result than a fundamental starting point. After all, it makes sense to ask what kind 
of social institution a declarative speech act is (Smit and Buekens 2017). Only when the answer 
comes could we have building blocks for a more general account of social reality. Thus, although 
Searle includes language within the scope of his theory, he fails to deliver. Guala’s case is in 
many ways the opposite in that the announced scope of his theory does not include language.  
Consequently, it seems less unifying as it is narrower in scope. This is a pity, because in our 
judgment his theory is better equipped to handle the institutional elements that are constitutive 
of language. Furthermore, explicit consideration of language would have helped Guala to 
formulate applications of his theory. For example, his discussion of ‘meaning’ (Guala 2016, 
Chapter 13)—which is somewhat disappointing—would have benefited from this.  
Guala and Greif 
We have shown that Guala’s unified theory combines the rules and equilibrium accounts of 
institutions. Although economists sometimes characterize institutions as “rules of the game” 
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(North 1990; Ostrom 1990) and sometimes as equilibrium phenomena4 (Calvert 1995; Schotter 
1981; Sugden 1986), they commonly recognize that these views are complementary, and 
acknowledge their limitations.5 
“Which definition of an institution to adopt is not an issue of right or wrong; it 
depends on the purpose of the analysis” (Aoki 2001, 10). 
“These two approaches can be seen as complementary parts of the analysts 
[sic] toolkit” (Greif and Kingston 2011, 41). 
There have been attempts to bring the rules and equilibrium accounts under an inclusive 
framework to study various aspects of institutions (e.g., Aoki 2001; Greif 2006). The most 
prominent of these is Avner Greif’s attempt to create a unified framework by synthesizing 
various definitions of institution found in the social sciences literature. In Institutions and the 
Path to the Modern Economy (2006), Greif defines an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs, 
norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior" (Greif 
2006, 30). He calls the components of this system—i.e., rules, beliefs, norms, and 
organizations—institutional elements. According to his characterization each institutional 
                                                        
4 Occasionally they also distinguish between the players of the game and the rules of the game (North 
1990) to separate organizations such as firms, banks, and regulatory bodies from the formal and informal 
rules that enable and restrict their actions. 
5 It is a mistake to assume that any one of these approaches is uniform in terms of its methodology. For 
example, equilibrium view of institutions employs a diverse set of equilibrium concepts (Nash, subgame 
perfect, evolutionarily stable, stochastically stable, etc.) and assumptions (full rationality, bounded 
rationality, perfect information, imperfect information etc.). These different approaches are also 
considered as complementary by many economists (e.g., Aoki 2001, 194–97). 
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element “is social in being a man-made, nonphysical factor that is exogenous to each individual 
whose behavior it influences. Together these components motivate, enable, and guide 
individuals to follow one behavior among the many that are technologically feasible in social 
situations” (Greif 2006, 30).  
Greif’s motivation for unifying these two approaches is similar to Guala’s, who also argues that 
the rules approach alone cannot explain why people follow certain rules, but not others. 
However, Greif’s attempt to unify the definitions of institutions is not restricted to these two 
views. His definition “encompasses other seemingly alternative definitions” and aims at 
fostering the “integration of insights and analytical frameworks developed in conjunction with 
various definitions of institutions" (Greif 2006, 29). In fact, he purports to bring together 
different traditions in the social sciences and economics: old and new institutional economics, 
as well as prominent accounts of institutions in sociology, organization studies, history, political 
science, and philosophy (Greif 2006, 22–23, 39–40).6 In contrast with Guala’s account, this list 
is much more extensive. It is also noticeable that although social ontology is included, it has no 
special role. It is just one approach that might have some insights into the nature of institutions. 
Greif’s unification attempt might seem overly ambitious, but he does not seek to absorb all of 
these distinct approaches in one comprehensive theory. Moreover, from a purely philosophical 
perspective, his definition of institution may appear circular: a philosopher might regard many 
of his institutional elements as institutions in themselves, for example. However, Greif’s aim is 
not ontological reconstruction, but rather to build a common analytical framework for 
explanatory purposes. Furthermore, his explanatory targets are particular institutions. He 
describes his project as an “attempt to gain a better understanding of a particular historical 
episode and to learn about institutions in general from this period” (Greif 2006, xvi). He argues 
                                                        
6 Among others Greif cites Searle (1995). 
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that the unified framework should not accept generalizing presumptions—concerning the 
origins, functions and effects of institutions—of any of the distinct views his synthesis brings 
together. He even suggests that any theory of institutions is limited in its ability to study their 
origins, functions and effects because of their essential indeterminacy: institutions are complex, 
contingent and context-dependent phenomena, and understanding particular institutions 
requires theoretical as well as empirical/historical research (Greif 2006, 350–76).  
Guala and Greif see the role and prospects of a general theory quite differently. Although both 
accept the context-specificity of institutions, unlike Guala, Greif considers this a constraint on 
what the theory can accomplish. Whereas Guala is optimistic about finding commonalities 
between institutions at a very general level, Greif places his bets on the usefulness of theoretical 
ideas in enhancing understanding of particular institutions. His approach is a refined example 
of the analytic narratives approach (Bates et al. 1998), which claims to take the context-
specificity of institutions seriously.7 As a consequence, Greif considers game theory a useful 
analytical tool (Greif 2006, 387), but refrains from defining institutions as game-theoretic 
equilibria. He argues,  
“Institutions are not game-theoretic equilibria, games are not the basic unit of 
institutional analysis, and game theory does not provide us with a theory of 
institutions. Indeed, the key to advancing institutional analysis by using game 
                                                        
7 An analytic narrative combines “analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political 
science with the narrative form” that “pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context”. Analytic 
narrative is, nevertheless, “analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning” that draws 
predominantly on game theory and rational choice theory to “facilitate both exposition and explanation" 
(Bates et al. 1998, 10). Greif argues that this approach is particularly suited to the study of institutions 
because of the context-specificity of institutions. 
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theory is precisely to recognize the difference between game-theoretic 
equilibrium analysis and institutional analysis.” (Greif 2006, 19) 
Institutional analysis, unlike abstract game-theoretical analysis, must take the local and 
historical institutional constraints into account. Greif is not solely focused on explaining the 
stability or persistence of institutions, he is also interested in accounting for their change and 
their effects on individuals and other institutions. What sets him aside from a typical social 
historian or historical sociologist is his belief in the usefulness of formal game theory and 
models of rational choice in the study of particular institutions. What sets him aside from Guala 
is the historical and empirical orientation of his approach. 
In sum, there is a stark contrast between Guala’s philosophical high-level theorizing and Greif’s 
applied analytic framework, which is comparative and context-specific. Whereas Guala’s 
composite unification strategy promises field unification at an abstract level, Greif attempts to 
bring together insights from different social sciences under a common analytical framework to 
explain particular institutions. Guala aims in his functionalist account to foster understanding of 
the stability and persistence of institutions at a general level. Greif’s framework, on the other 
hand, aims at explaining stability, change, and the effects of particular institutions—without 
assuming much about their origins and functions.  
Lessons about unification and abstraction 
We have briefly discussed three theories about social institutions with respect to three 
dimensions: unification, scope and explanatory goals. It has turned out that unification can 
mean many things. First, it could consist of a synthesis of existing theories. This composite 
unification brings together theories that have been developed separately to produce a more 
complex theory, which is what Guala does with game-theoretical ideas about institutions, 
incentivized action theory and Hindriks’ reductive theory of constitutive rules. Similarly, he 
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synthesizes rule and equilibrium approaches to institutions. A second dimension of unification 
is field unification, which is also part of Guala’s agenda. He aims to bring together social 
ontology and social-scientific approaches to social institutions. Here his approach is in sharp 
contrast with Searle’s project to provide a general ontological theory about all social institutions. 
Searle’s is theoretical unification of the domain via a comprehensive theory. Guala shares the 
same goal, but he has a more inclusive idea of the domain. For him, the general theory of 
institutions should bring together both philosophical and social-scientific theorizing. Underlying 
this ambition is a different conceptualization of the tasks of the general theory, and a different 
vision of the intellectual division of labor between the fields.  
Turning to Greif, we find another set of ideas about unification. Both Guala and Greif pursue the 
goal of unifying the rule and equilibrium approaches to institutions, but they are doing quite 
different things. Whereas Guala aims at composite unification, Greif more modestly suggests 
that the two approaches are complementary. There is no reason to treat these conceptions of 
unification as mutually exclusive alternatives, however. Guala’s notion is stronger: the 
successful achievement of his goal implies that Greif’s goal is also achieved, but not vice versa. 
However, this observation holds only when we limit our attention to the unification of these two 
economic approaches to institutions. The reason for this is that, for Greif, the unification of the 
rule and equilibrium approaches is only part of a larger project. His aim is to produce a 
conceptual and analytical framework that also brings in ideas also from sociology, political 
science, cognitive science, and history. It is not at all clear that the completion of Guala’s project 
would also complete Greif’s more extensive version, which has many more elements to be 
integrated. Again, it should be noted that Guala and Greif operate on very different levels of 
abstraction: Guala aims at a general theory, whereas Greif’s unification is achieved via a 
synthetic definition of institution that facilitates the incorporation of insights from different 
approaches into an analysis of particular institutions. What is missing from Greif’s version is 
philosophical ambition: he is not intent on building a philosophical theory about institutions, 
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but is satisfied with enabling a multidisciplinary approach to facilitate their comparative and 




Persistence Change Emergence 
Searle ●    
Guala ● ●   
Greif  ● ●  
 
Table 1. Explanatory goals 
The diversity of theoretical aims among these three authors also carries implications for their 
explanatory goals. Despite its simplicity, Table 1 conveniently summarizes the differences and 
similarities between the three conceptions of the theory of institutions with respect to 
explanatory goals.  Searle’s only goal is to come up with an ontological reconstruction of the 
institutional reality. Such a reconstruction basically provides a philosophical explanation of the 
nature of institutions: it tells us what it is to be an institution. Greif, in contrast, aims at enabling 
explanations of stability and change in particular social institutions. The comparison between 
Searle and Greif makes it easy to understand why there has been little interaction between 
philosophy and the social sciences. Apart from the big differences in the levels of abstraction, 
the explanatory goals are quite separate. Guala, on the other hand, aspires to connect social 
ontology and the social sciences. He retains the goal of providing an ontological reconstruction 
of institutions, but he adds the goal of accounting for their stability and persistence, while 
explaining that the emergence and change of institutions remains outside his theory. 
Interestingly, this compromise is not arbitrary, but follows from the chosen level of abstraction: 
the goal of analyzing the generic features of institutions cannot accommodate the quite diverse 
elements of particular situations that are needed for the explanation of their emergence and 
change. None of the authors we discuss in this paper is interested in explaining the emergence of 
institutions. For this reason, the last column in Table 1 remains an empty placeholder for 
approaches such as evolutionary game theory and historical analysis, which at very different 
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levels of abstraction address the issue of how new institutions arise. It remains to be seen 
whether they can be incorporated into a “unified” theory of institutions. 
The above discussion seems to imply that there are two separate projects in the literature. The 
first is the project of social ontology, the aim of which is to show how the social world fits into 
the world’s ontological furniture. This kind of philosophical theory needs to account for 
institutions, language (whether or not it is regarded as an institution), and the diverse things 
Searle dismissively calls “systematic fallouts”. We are still waiting for such a comprehensive 
theory, but it seems that we do have some idea of what it would look like. The second concerns 
the development of theoretical tools for analyzing and explaining institutions. As a social-
scientific project it would purport to explain the emergence, stability, and change of real-world 
institutions. In contrast to the first project, it is not clear that such theoretical work will end up 
in a general theory of social institutions. Indeed, it is possible that Greif-style integrative 
theorizing might be more productive. What would be a proper level of abstraction for such 
theorizing is an open question. It may be that theorizing that is too general abstracts from the 
truly interesting stuff about the institutional reality.  
This raises a concern about Guala’s theoretical project: the preference for too abstract theorizing 
might be a bad equilibrium. Both social ontology and game theory address highly abstract and 
stylized explananda. Compared to other approaches in the social sciences, they are outliers in 
this respect. When these two are selected as the main components of theoretical synthesis, the 
result is also highly abstract. They focus mainly on “types” of institutions, whereas other 
approaches are primarily engaged in explaining particular institutions and understanding their 
relation to the historical and social context. We call this possible bad equilibrium, because it is 
possible that the abstract concerns of social ontology and game theory reinforce each other and 
make it easier to ignore the approaches that do not share their abstract focus. In other words, 
unifying the two might seem a significant achievement from the inside, but from the outside it 
20 
 
looks like entrenchment of the major obstacle to fruitful interaction between social ontology and 
social scientific analysis of institutions. 
This basically challenges Guala’s ability to cash his first promissory note. Let us consider 
sociology: although institutions are one of its main focuses of interest, there is very little general 
sociological theorizing about institutions that could be compared to social ontology and game 
theory. Why is this? It could be that sociologists are simply wrong, but it could also be that they 
have not found general theories very useful in terms of understanding real-world institutions. 
Their focus is very much on the emergence, change and effects of institutions. This is in sharp 
contrast with social ontology and game theory with their strong tendency to treat emergence and 
change as simply exogenous explananda, that can be dealt by giving some abstract pointers to 
salience/focal points, delta parameters, and actual motivations, for example. We do not deny the 
usefulness of this approach for certain purposes, but given its ambitions, Guala’s theory should 
demonstrate its ability for fruitful engagement in empirical work on institutions; hence its 
fruitfulness and social-scientific legitimacy. 
As our earlier discussion on the type-token distinction shows, the relation between general 
institutional concepts and particular institutions is more complex than Guala assumes. The 
rather simple toy models of institutions might be useful for the purposes of proof-of-the-concept 
theorizing, but extending these abstract results to the explanation of concrete institutional 
practices might be tricky. As Guala recognizes, particular institutions are historically changing, 
context-dependent things. For example, both Florentine and Mayan marriage are parts of a 
seamless web of other institutions and social practices, and as Guala is well aware, these 
institutions do not necessarily solve the same kind of coordination and cooperation problems. In 
fact, he argues that marriage solves several problems, and regulates a cluster of activities, none 
of which are essential but still constitute a natural kind (2016, 198–99). The basis for this claim 
is the assumption that “as long as a contract regulates (formally or informally) a cluster of 
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activities of this sort, it is legitimate to speak of marriage" (2016, 199). The key assumption here 
is that social institution types can be conceived of as social kinds that are analogical to natural 
kinds. According to Guala, “what marriage is, or what deserves to be called "marriage;' […]  
depends on how the world is, in particular what kind of problems the institution of marriage (in 
its various instantiations) solves” (2016, 199). This is the most important (largely) implicit 
assumption in his approach, but although it is openly expressed in the last chapter, it is not 
explicitly defended in the book.  
We remain skeptical about this natural-kind solution to the problem of general concepts in the 
social sciences. Perusal of the literature in the social sciences that study marriage (mainly 
anthropology and sociology) does not give any indication that they would finally reach 
consensus about the cluster of activities that define marriage. The same goes for property and 
money. It might well be that as far as economists are concerned, money has three central 
functions: as a medium of exchange, a unit of accounting, and a store of value. However, this is 
not the result of an extensive research of archaeological, anthropological, and historical sources, 
it is a theoretically motivated stipulation. We are not challenging the legitimacy of economists’ 
conceptualization for many theoretical purposes. We are merely claiming that these functions do 
not define a natural kind that would serve as a type to all particular institutions of money.  
In our view, the study of institutions should focus on particular institutions as historical causal 
complexes, not on their postulated abstract functional essences. From this alternative 
perspective, social mechanisms constitute the generalizable core of the social sciences, not 
natural-kind-based generalizations about institutions. Of course, there are many generalizations 
to be made about institutions. However, they are not universal but are rather bound to historical 
and institutional background conditions. Particular institutions such as Florentine and Mayan 
marriage are complex and historically changing. Because we conceive of institutions as historical 
individuals, we do not see any reason to assume that explaining their stability or persistence has 
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any explanatory priority. Explaining persistence is important, but so is accounting for the 
changes and origin. Analysts of institutions should aim at a causal account that will take care of 
both. This constitutes an alternative view of unification: whereas Guala is ready to accept that 
the rules-in-equilibrium account explains only the persistence of institutions and answers to 
other questions require a “different style of explanation” (2016, 31), our idea would be that a 
general causal account would accommodate all the relevant explananda. The motivation for our 
view is not purely philosophical. We also believe that the presumption of functional essences for 
institution types might make us blind to important changes in our institutional environment. 
For example, if one considers the future of money, it might be fruitful to relax the assumption 
that it always has three functions, or that it solves a specific set of problems (Birch 2017). 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have compared three very different visions of a unified theory of social 
institutions. We found out that unification can be many things, and that it may be associated 
with diverse explanatory goals. We have also presented some critical comments about Guala’s 
project. However, our doubts should not obscure the bigger picture. We firmly believe that 
Guala’s composite unification strategy is skillfully implemented and that field unification is a 
precious goal that is worth making every effort to pursue. Our aim was to facilitate the further 
pursuit of this goal by way of closely looking at Guala’s theory in comparison to two prominent 
alternatives. What we have learned is simply the following: Guala’s Understanding Institutions 
is an excellent first step, but there is still work to be done. Our suggestion to social ontologists is 
as follows: Follow Guala in taking seriously what the social sciences have to say about 
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